Is it solely from the human standpoint that we can speak of space?

According to Kant, are space and time real?

Does Kant extend to �primary qualities� what Locke had argued about �secondary qualities�?

What is the difference between �dependence on particular experience� and �dependence on experience in general�?

Is Kant a Berkleian phenomenalist with respect to the world as appearance?

Greg Detre

Wednesday, March 07, 2001

Lucy Allais, History of Philosophy VIII

Space and time hold a special place in Kant�s system. However, quite what that place is is up for debate.

Strawson�s approach in chapter 2 of Individuals, is somewhat unorthodox.

Strawson talks of distinguishing and reidentifying particulars. The first enables us to compartmentalise experience, the second to be able to tell when we experience a particular again.

He considers the case of Hero, a being whose experience is purely auditory. The question is whether or not Hero can be said to have a concept of space, and indeed of �objective particulars� at all.

He asks the question, �Could such a being have a non-sollipsistic view of the world?�

In a way, we can see Strawson trying to do just what Kant said we could not, that is imagine a situation where a concept of space need not, but still may, exist.

However, it is worth noting that Strawson�s thought experiment deprives us of space, but not time. This leaves the path open for those such as Mill, who would define space purely in terms of time. This would come under what Gareth Evans terms a �serial� conception of space, where our spatial map is conceived bit by bit over time and remains framed through time , i.e. �travel-based�. On the other hand, the �simulataneous� conception of space �

Evans picks Strawson�s account apart on a number of grounds, even though he likes what Strawson has attempted.